Two agency theories have dominated the corporate ownership debate, the convergence of interest and the entrenchment hypothesis. Following the work of Ang et al. (2000) and Sing and Davidson (2003) to a panel of 266 Taiwanese listed companies for the 1996-2006 period, we adopt an advanced panel threshold regression model to determine whether managerial ownership reduces agency costs. We find when managerial ownership is less than 36.55% or greater than 59.06%, consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, a 1% increase in the managerial ownership decreases asset utilization efficiency by 0.32% and 0.5%, respectively. However, managerial ownership is between 51.35% and 59.06%, consistent with the convergence of interest hypothesis, a 1% increase in the managerial ownership increases asset utilization efficiency by 0.21%.
Introduction
Theory indicates that managerial ownership in a firm generates two agency costs between managers and shareholders, i.e. the convergence of interest and the entrenchment hypothesis. Under the former, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , as insider ownership increases, managerial ownership serves to align the interests of managers and outside shareholders, agency costs will decline. However, under the latter, managers with larger shareholdings have greater control over the company. They may become entrenched through any mechanism that makes them immune from the discipline of the markets. An increasing ownership to a point at which managers become entrenched will actually increase agency costs (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Schooley and Barney, 1994; and Morck et al., 1988) . A number of studies since Jensen and Meckling (1976) have sought to evaluate empirically the effect of agency costs on ownership structure. One limitation with these studies, however, is that the absolute and relative measures of agency costs are rarely discussed, until Ang et al. (henceforth ACL) (2000) adopt both asset utilization and discretionary expenditures as a proxy for agency cost. .
Following the work of ACL and Sing and Davidson (henceforth SD) (2003) to a panel of 266
Taiwanese listed companies for the 1996-2006 period, we adopt an advanced panel threshold regression model to determine whether there is a -threshold‖ optimal managerial ownership which reduces agency cost. We find that when managerial ownership is less than 36.55% and greater than 59.06% consistent with entrenchment hypothesis reflecting higher agency cost, asset utilization efficiency decreases by 0.32% and 0.5%, respectively, with a 1% increase in the managerial ownership. Especially, when managerial ownership is less than 5.27%, higher agency cost reflecting in excessive discretionary expenses, a 1% increase in the managerial ownership increases SG&A expenses by 12.89%. However, managerial ownership is between 51.35% and 59.06% reflecting lower agency costs, a 1% increase in the managerial ownership increases asset utilization efficiency by 0.21%. Therefore, when managerial ownership is between 51.35% and 59.06%, consistent with the convergence of interest hypothesis, where enhances the asset utilization efficiency and managerial ownership mitigates principal-agent conflicts.
This empirical study contributes to the previous literature in two respects. Firstly, according to prior studies that agency costs decline with increases in managerial ownership to a point, but after entrenchment occurs, agency costs increase with increases in managerial ownership. In contrast to traditional linear models, Hansen's (1999) advanced panel threshold regression model, namely a nonlinear threshold model applied in this study, is able to determine whether there is a -threshold‖ optimal managerial ownership which reduces agency cost. Secondly, we use panel data for Taiwanese listed companies to fully explore the managerial ownership characteristics of various industries in Taiwan. Unlike that in the U.S., the firm in Taiwan is characterized by low institutional ownership and an inactive market for corporate control, especially that in relation to the board of directors. Moreover, shareholders have fewer rights in Taiwan than in the U.S. Thus, a natural setting for examining the influence of managerial ownership effects on agency cost is provided in Taiwan.
The rest paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the results of previous empirical research. Section 3 provides the sample data, the variables we use in our empirical analysis and describes the methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes and presents a few implications that emerge from our findings. Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesized that agency problem worsens as managerial ownership decreases. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) conclude that ownership concentration is used to offset agency problems, while Crutchley and Hansen (1989) and Bathala, et al. (1994) notes that higher levels of insider ownership may be used to decrease agency costs. Consistent with the existence of the two agency costs, a series of papers examine the effect of managerial ownership on firm value. Morck et al. (1988) look at the relationship between managerial ownership and performance in a 1980 cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 firms. They find that Tobin's Q rises as managerial ownership increases from 0% to 5%, decreases within the managerial ownership range of 5% to25%, and increases again beyond 25%. Several subsequent studies ( e.g. Cho Han (2006) examines the relationship between insider ownership and firm value using panel data on real estate investment trusts, and finds a significant nonlinear relation between Tobin's Q and insider ownership that is consistent with the trade-off between the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect of insider ownership. Dwivedi and Jain (2007) show that directors' shareholding has a non-linear negative relationship with firm value in listed Indian firms. Using small privately owned firms to proxy a zero-agency cost for the 100% ownermanager firm, Ang et al. (2000) find that agency costs are higher when manager's ownership share are small, when the number of non-manager shareholders increase, and when outsiders manage the firm. Sing and Davidson (2003) extend the work of Ang et al. (2000) to large firms. They find that managerial ownership is positively related to asset utilization but does not serve as a significant deterrent to excessive discretionary expenses. Furthermore, smaller boards serve the same role, but outside block ownership and independent outsiders on a board do not appear to protect the firm from agency costs. Using a survey sample of approximately 3800 Australian small and medium enterprises for 1996 -1997 and 1997 -1998 , Fleming et al.(2005 find that a positive relationship between equity agency costs and the separation of ownership and control. Following the approach in Ang et al. (2000) , Davidson et al. (2006) find that greater CEO ownership is associated with lower agency costs both before and after the IPO. Further board composition and involvement by venture capital firms does not appear to mitigate agency costs. 
Managerial ownership and agency costs

B. Measures
Following ACL and SD, for the first measure of agency costs the ratio of annual sales to total assets is adopted as the first proxy for agency costs related to management's ability to utilize assets efficiently. The higher the asset turnover ratio, the larger amount of sales and eventually cash flow the firm has in a specific level of assets. Whereas the lower asset turnover ratio reflects that managers have deployed assets in unproductive purposes that unable to generate cash flows. Thus, it's expected that the higher asset turnover ratios that a firm has, the lower agency conflict the firms has. As in SD, the ratio of selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses to total sales is used as a second proxy for agency cost reflecting management excessive pay and perquisite consumption. It's expected that when agency costs are high, managers will consume relatively large discretionary expense on SG&A expenses. Conversely, when agency costs are low, managers will save relatively large SG&A expenses.
There are two categories of explanatory variables in our panel data. The threshold variable, i.e., managerial ownership (MOWN) is measured by the total common equity held by all managers (directors, supervisors, and top executives) as a fraction of common equity outstanding, the key variable commonly used in the prior studies (e.g., McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Hanson and Song,2000 ;Cheung and Wei,2006) that we use it to investigate whether there is an asymmetric threshold effect of managerial ownership on agency cost. As in SD, three control variables commonly used in the analysis of agency cost are also included in this study; namely, the natural log of the book value of total assets (Size) to capture intangibles related to the firm's size; the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Leverage); and the board size (Board), which is calculated as the number of board members (director and supervisor). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our pooled sample of the 1996-2006 period. The total number of firms is 266, and there are a total of 2,926 firm-year observations. A comparison of the agency cost statistics in our sample with those in the SD sample reveals that our sample has considerably higher asset utilization efficiency than those in the SD sample. Our pooled sample mean is 69. 84 and median is 59, while they show an average asset turnover ratio of As for the control variables, on average for the pooled sample, the average board of director and supervisor is composed of 10.09 members, the ratio for Leverage is 40.12%, the size distribution of our sample firm is also skewed by the large differences between mean (18582million NT$) and median (7470.36 million NT$) total assets. On the basis of the Jarque-Bera test results, the normality of all the variables is rejected.
<Insert Table 1 Table 2 , it is abundantly clear that all the variables have stationary characteristics since the nulls of the unit root are mostly rejected.
<Insert Table 2 
Furthermore, if the single threshold is indeed exists, we can extend the panel threshold regression model with single threshold to the double as follows. ） .
Empirical Results
As indicated by Hansen (1999) , if there is a threshold effect, then the existence of a triple, double, and single threshold effect must be tested. The bootstrap method proposed by Hansen (1999) is followed to obtain the approximations of the F statistics and then the p-values is to be calculated. The bootstrap procedure is repeated 1000 times for each of the three panel threshold tests. Panel A of Table 3 presents test statistics F 1 , F 2 , and F 3 , along with their bootstrap pvalues of the effect of managerial ownership on the asset turnover ratio. We find that the test for a single threshold F 1 and a double threshold F 2 is insignificant with a bootstrap p-value of 0.119 and 0.178, respectively; only the test for a triple threshold F 3 is significant with a bootstrap p-value of 0.087. Thus, it's concluded that managerial ownership has three threshold effects on asset turnover ratio. The point estimates of the three thresholds ( 36.55%, 51.35% and 59.06%,and they separate all of the observations into four regimes.
Panel B of Table 3 shows the same test statistics of the relationship between managerial ownership and the ratio of SG&A to total sales. It's found that only a single threshold F 1 is significant with a bootstrap pvalue of 0.012, a double threshold F 2 and a triple threshold F 3 are insignificant with a bootstrap p-value of 0.185 and 0.157, respectively. Thus, we conclude that managerial ownership has single threshold effect on the ratio of SG&A to total sales. The point estimate of the single threshold ( 1  ) is 5.27 and it separates all of the observations into two regimes. The estimated model from our empirical results of managerial ownership and agency cost is represented as follows: asset turnover ratio in model (3) and the ratio of SG&A to total sales in model (4) as dependent variable for proxy agency cost, respectively.  is -0.3203, which indicates that asset turnover ratio decreases by 0.3203% with an increase of 1% in managerial ownership. In the second regime, where the managerial ownership is greater than 36.55% and less than 51.35%, the estimate of coefficient 2  is 0.0835, but insignificant, which indicates that no relationship between managerial ownership and asset turnover ratio. In the third regime, where the managerial ownership is greater than 51.35% and less than 59.06%, the estimate of coefficient 3  is 0.2127, which indicates that asset turnover ratio increases by 0.2127% with an increase of 1% in managerial ownership. In the fourth regime, where the managerial ownership is greater than 59.06%, the estimate of coefficient 4  is 0.5865, which indicates that asset turnover ratio increases by 0.5865% with an increase of 1% in managerial ownership. Our empirical result indicates that when managerial ownership is less than 36.55 or greater than 59.06%, a 1% increase in managerial ownership decreases asset utilization efficiency (increases agency costs) by 0.3203% and 0.5865%, respectively. Conversely, when managerial ownership is between 51.35% and 59.06%, a 1% increase in managerial ownership increases asset utilization efficiency (reduces agency costs) by 0.2127%, where managerial ownership improves asset utilization efficiency and reduces agency costs.
The coefficients of two regimes are further presented when the ratio of SG&A to total sales as proxy for agency cost in Panel B of Table 4. 1  is 12.8924, significant under the consideration of homogenous standard errors and heterogeneous standard errors (at the 1% and 10%,respectively). 2  is 0.0527 but insignificant. In the first regime, where the managerial ownership is less than 5.27%, the estimate of coefficient 1  is 12.8924, which indicates that the ratio of SG&A to total sales increases by 12.8924% with an increase of 1% in managerial ownership. In the second regime, where the managerial ownership is greater than 5.27%, the estimate of coefficient 2  is insignificant, which indicates that no relationship between managerial ownership and the ratio of SG&A to total sales. Our empirical result indicates that when managerial ownership is less than 5.27, a 1% increase in managerial ownership increases SG&A expenses (increases agency costs) by 12.8924%.
Overall, combining together with both results of the asset turnover ratio and SG&A expense ratio as proxy for agency cost, it's concluded that when managerial ownership is less than 36.55 or greater than 59.06% reflecting asset utilization inefficiency and higher agency cost, especially, when managerial ownership less than 5.27% cannot deterrent excessive discretionary (SG&A) expenses. However, when managerial ownership is between 51.35% and 59.06% managerial ownership reduces agency costs through enhancing asset utilization efficiency.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
In the estimations of the coefficients of the control variables, shown in Table 5 , it's noted that firm Size is significantly and negatively related to either asset turnover ratio in Panel A of Table 5 or SG&A expense ratio in Panel B of Table 5 . The interpretation here is that lager firms have lower asset utilization efficiency but higher SG&A expense saving. The Leverage is significantly and positively related to both asset turnover ratio and SG&A expense ratio. This means that the higher the leverage that a firm has, the higher is its asset utilization efficiency, but the higher the leverage that a firm has, the higher is its SG&A expense consuming. Finally, Board size is not significantly related to agency cost as proxy by both asset turnover ratio and SG&A expense ratio. Thus, Board size does not affect agency costs.
<Insert Table 5 about here>
Conclusion
Two main agency theories currently dominate the corporate ownership structure debate, namely the convergence of interest and the entrenchment hypothesis. A number of studies since Jensen and Meckling (1976) have sought to evaluate empirically the effect of agency costs on ownership structure, but until Ang et al. (2000) adopting the absolute and relative measures of agency costs by asset utilization and discretionary expenditures. Following the work of Sing and Davidson (2003) , this paper analyzes whether managerial ownership affects agency cost by using a panel of 266 Taiwanese listed companies in 18 industries during the eleven-year 1996-2006 period. An advanced panel threshold regression model is adopted to determine whether managerial ownership reduces agency cost. This shift in financing sources propels the nonlinear relationship that we uncover in this study and sheds fresh light on existing agency theories of corporate ownership structure.
Overall, this study provides evidence that when managerial ownership is less than 36.55 or greater than 59.06% reflecting asset utilization inefficiency and higher agency cost, especially, when managerial ownership less than 5.27% does not deterrent excessive discretionary (SG&A) expenses. While managerial ownership is between 51.35% and 59.06% reflecting lower agency costs, a 1% increase in the managerial ownership increases asset utilization efficiency by 0.21%, where consistent with the convergence of interest hypothesis, enhances the asset utilization efficiency and managerial ownership mitigates principal-agent conflicts. These results are some consistent with those in Sing and Davidson (2003) . It's recommended that future research be conducted to continue this line of work. While this study offers some solid evidence with regard to the influence of managerial ownership on agency cost, it might be expected that this influence should be felt beyond the managerial ownership structure. Other outside monitoring mechanism such as outside block ownership and institutional ownership are hypothesized to affect agency costs. For a greater understanding, it's suggested to confirm the findings herein that the alternative external influences on agency costs could also be simultaneously included. ratio is measured as the ratio of annual sales to total assets. SG&A expense ratio is measured as the ratio of selling, general, and administrative expenses, SG&A, to total sales. Mown is measured by the total common equity held by all managers (directors, supervisors, and top executives) as a fraction of common equity outstanding. Leverage is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Sales growth is calculated as the annual percent change in sales. Notes: F Statistics and p-values result from repeating the bootstrap procedure 1000 times for each of the three bootstrap tests.
***, **, and *, represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.Notes.  represent the estimated coefficients: Size, Leverage, and Board . ***, **, and *, represent the significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
